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Aiming high, falling short: 
the Least Developed Country (LDC) category at 40 
 
Djalita Fialho 




Why have 94% of LDCs not escaped poverty during the last four decades? This paper analyses 
the motivation behind the UN decision to establish the LDC category in 1971. The reviewed 
literature  highlights  the  conflicting  interests  of  the  actors  involved.  It  provides  a  historical 
account of the creation of the category and an international political economy analysis of that 
process. Based on this literature, I argue that the initial LDC identification process - which set a 
precedent for future LDC categorizations - was manipulated in order to generate a reduced list 
of small and economically and politically insignificant countries. Contrary to the LDC official 
narrative, this list served the interests of both donors (by undermining the UN’s implicit effort to 
normalize international assistance) and other non-LDC developing countries (disturbed by the 
creation of a positive discrimination within the group, favoring the most disadvantaged among 
them). As a result of this manipulation, considerably less development-promoting efforts have 
been demanded from donors, which has, in turn, not significantly distressed the interests of other 
non-LDC developing countries. 
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1.  Introduction 
In May 2011 the international community, under the auspices of the UN, gathered for the fourth 
time in 40 years to assess progresses made by the least developed country (LDC) group. The 
conference  took  place  in  Istanbul,  under  the  grim  shadow  of  a  stagnant  and  non-evolving 
category, whose membership has not declined for most of its lifespan. The main goal was “(a) to 
reverse the marginalization of LDCs ... and to help them catch up; (b) to support a pattern of 
accelerated and sustained economic growth … and (c) to help LDCs graduate from LDC status” 
(UNCTAD, 2010: 83). To achieve this, the Istanbul Plan of Action was adopted. Like other main 
LDC  literature  (UNCTAD‟s  LDC  Reports  1984  -  2010,  UN  2001,  UNCDP  2008  and 
Guillaumont 2009), the Plan‟s focus on goodwill and technicalities impedes it from questioning 
and problematizing the category‟s assumptions
1. The Istanbul outcome document fails to address 
                                                           
1 The belief that it actually groups the  most in need and  the conviction that donors are exclusively  moved by 
altruism. 2 
 
political economy issues and, hence, cannot represent a true overhaul effort. It does not consider 
the distribution of power nor the costs and benefits borne by the actors involved (Cornia, 2011: 
15). 
 
The official narrative is that, through the LDC category, donors should provide these countries 
with special benefits, given their disadvantaged position in the world economy (UNCDP, 2008: 
v). This to ensure catching up and, as a result, a more leveled playing field in the arena where 
countries engage one another. Thus, a declining number of LDCs  is the ultimate aim of the 
category. This has not been achieved. Today, 40 years after the establishment of the category, 
only three countries have graduated out of it
2; representing a disappointing 6% success rate. 
 
This paper provides a mainly historical account of the creation of the LDC category, investigating 
what drove its creation in 1971.  The analysis addresses other interrelated subquestions, namely: 
Why were the thresholds set up at those levels? Were the criteria purposely chosen so as to 
exclude certain countries?
3 What informed these decisions? Which countries were (intentionally 
or not) left out or included because of these criteria? Which  groups of countries (LDCs, other 
non-LDC developing countries and donors) benefitted the most  from the establishment of the 
category? 
 
The group is still composed of 48 countries, spanning three regions ( see Table 1), with Africa 
assuming the lead: 33 out of 48 LDCs are African countries; representing 68.7%. From the initial 
25 LDCs identified in 1971, the category grew to a total of 51 countries
4 and membership fell to 
48, following the three graduation cases to date. 
 
Table 1. List of LDCs and GDP per capita in constant prices - US dollars (1971 and 2009) 
Africa  1971  2009  Asia and 
the Pacific 
1971  2009  Latin America 
and the Caribbean 
1971  2009 
Angola  485  1,892  Afghanistan  151  457  Haiti  76  626 
Benin  112  739  Bangladesh  79  550       
Burkina Faso  80  517  Bhutan  219  1,783       
Burundi  96  151  Cambodia  89  729       
Central African 
Republic  151  448  Kiribati  493  1,335       




46  884       
Comoros  89  785  Myanmar  100  380       
Democratic 
Republic of the  172  170  Nepal  87  436       
                                                           
2 Botswana (1994), Cape Verde (2007) and Maldives (2011). 
3 For example, the share of manufacturing can be said to bias towards smaller countries, as the vulnerability criterion 
introduced later on. 
4 This happened as more countries became independent in the 70s and the poor performance of other  developing 
countries made them join the group in the 80s and 90s. 3 
 
Congo 
Djibouti  435  1,076  Samoa  330  2,926       
Equatorial 
Guinea  74  17,544  Solomon Islands  208  1,366       
Eritrea  N/A  369  Timor-Leste  N/A  593       
Ethiopia  N/A  345  Tuvalu  372  2,749       
Gambia  227  543  Vanuatu  483  2,687       
Guinea  161  470  Yemen  N/A  1,141       
Guinea-Bissau  490  517             
Lesotho  68  780             
Liberia  186  216             
Madagascar  144  448             
Malawi  119  318             
Mali  54  679             
Mauritania  185  866             
Mozambique  351  418             
Niger  101  343             
Rwanda  74  527             
São Tomé and 
Príncipe  498  1,302             
Senegal  228  1,018             
Sierra Leone  192  393             
Somalia  95  220             
Sudan  148  1,305             
Togo  135  480             
Uganda  157  523             
United Republic 
of Tanzania  145  526             
Zambia  386  985             









The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2.1 frames the inquiry by briefly 
reviewing  world  economic  and  political  context,  as  well  as  main  theoretical  approaches  and 
analytical  models  informing  the  mainstream  development  paradigm  at  the  time,  ultimately 
influencing scholars and policy-makers alike; section 2.2 presents the facts and protagonists of 
the  process  that  culminated  with  the  creation  of  the  LDC  category  in  1971;  section  2.3 
investigates the responses to the establishment of this new category and section 3 concludes and 
presents possible avenues for further research. 
 
 
2.  The establishment of the LDC category: historical perspective 
 
2.1. World  context,  theoretical  approaches  and  analytical  models 
(1960s and 1970s) 
Within academia, particularly in the development literature, the perspective of the modernization 
theory  was  one  of  the  first  and  most  influential  theories  employed  in  Third  World  studies, 
analyzing progress mainly in terms of economic transition from tradition to modernity (Berger 
1994,  Brohman  1995,  Kamrava  1995,  Ma  1998).  According  to  this  theory,  the  concept  of 
development (in a world composed of two categories of countries: „developed‟ and „developing‟) 
is very much associated with “the construction of a single model of modernity based on the 
experience of a  few (industrialized) countries”  (Brohman, 1995:  122).  This  approach (which 
during  the  postwar  period  was  hegemonic  at  the  popular  and  academic  levels  and,  most 
importantly, greatly influenced policy ideas) imposed an idealized version of North America and 
Western Europe on Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Oceania (Berger, 1994: 
260); regions generally referred to as the „Third World‟. In other words, “the entire edifice of 
postwar modernisation theory rested on a homogeneous image of the „Third World‟ destined to 
follow the North American and Western European path” (Berger, 1994: 260). 
 
With the criticism of Eurocentrism and the claim of it serving the interests of capitalism hovering 
over it, modernization theory “gradually gave way to development studies, which … dropped the 
assumption of single destiny” (Ma, 1998: 339). By late 1960s, other alternative approaches came 
forward,  challenging  dominant  academic  and  policy  ideas.  From  the  dependency  theory 
perspective,  “although  the  theorization  as  a  whole  was  sharply  divergent,  the  difference  in 
categorization was only slight - it was „underdeveloped‟ countries that were the antithesis of 
„developed  countries‟” (Payne, 2001:  7).  Initially  associated with  Raúl  Prebisch and the  UN 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) (Berger, 1994: 260), this theory also tended to 
lump and homogenize the so-called „Third World‟, even though it focused on external factors to 
explain the lack of growth in poor countries. Unlike modernization theory, it placed the onus of 
underdevelopment  on  the  international  sphere,  blaming  external  pressures  for  the  deficient 
economic growth of poor countries. 
 5 
 
Another alternative development framework of the 1960s and 1970s  - world-system theory  - 
made use of a different dichotomist pair; that of core and periphery, intermediated by the notion 
of  semi-periphery,  stimulated  by  the  same  fundamental  thinking  influencing  the  dependency 
debate (Payne, 2001: 7). However, this approach postulates that “a particular country‟s internal 
development [can] only be „understood‟ with reference to the position it occupies, or the role it 
plays, in the modern world-system as a whole” (Berger, 1994: 263). Hence, inequality in terms of 
power and availability of resources is a central feature here. In essence, this approach considers 
that economic and political relations are the main determinants of countries‟ position in the world 
order. 
 
Despite  the  surfacing  and  diffusion  of  alternative  approaches  to  development,  modernization 
theory maintained its vitality, greatly influencing academics and policymakers. The UN, on its 
part was to a great extent financially and ideologically supported by the United States in an era 
when this great  power‟s concern was  to  avoid  the advance of communist ideas (Schlesinger 
1997). 
 
During  the  1960s  and  1970s  -  period  of  initial  debate  on  creating  the  LDC  category  -,  an 
important change was taking place within UN membership: increase in number and  voice of 
Third World countries and, consequently, call for a New International Economic Order
5. Before 
this, developing countries were powerless colonies. During this period they gained independence 
and were more in control of their development. They gained majority of votes in the UN, making 
it less important as hegemonic powers could no longer deal with an organization in which they 
did not control the majority.  It was a period of optimism, where newly independent countries 
successfully strived for development (e.g., economic growth was quite positive, even in most of 
sub-Saharan Africa), oftentimes supported by the conviction that rich countries owed them for 
the long period of colonial repression. 
 
It was  also during this period that (i) the UN proclaime d the First and Second Development 
Decades  (1961  and  1971,  respectively),  convened  the  first  UN  Conference  on  Trade  and 
Development (UNCTAD) (1964), created UNDP (1965) and the UN Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO) (1967) and adopted the Declarati on on the Establishment of a New 
International  Economic  Order  (1974);  and  (ii)  the  World  Bank  created  the  International 
Development Association (1960), the IMF established its compensatory financing facility (1963), 
Part IV of the GATT was integrated into this General Agreement (1965) (paving the way for the 
generalized system of preferences) and the joint IMF-World Bank Development Committee was 
                                                           
5 NIEO was a set of demands presented by Third World countries in 1974. It envisaged restructuring the international 
economic system to improve the position of developing countries with respect to developed countries. The demands 
included increased control by developing countries over their own resources, promotion of industrialization, increase 
of  development  assistance  and  debt  relief  (http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O48-
NewInternationalEconmcrdr.html). 6 
 
established  (1974)  (Thérien,  2002:  239).  These  initiatives  were  framed  according  to  the 
understanding  that  economic  growth  and  development  obeyed  a  rather  mechanical  and 
straightforward process, anchored in the conviction that foreign aid to poorer countries was sure 
to bear fruit. 
 
Connected to this is the fact that dominant postwar development theories were “ideologically 
linked  to  generalised  capitalist  interests  …  as  well  as  to  more  particular  US  interests  in 
maintaining its hegemonic global position in economic, political and military terms” (Brohman, 
1995:  133).  Therefore,  the  link  between  modernization  theory  and  US  national  interests, 
particularly  towards  the  global  expansion  of  capitalism  and  the  promotion  of  a  self-serving 
worldview, did not go unnoticed (Brohman, 1995: 133) and should also be recognized in the 
LDC context. 
 
What is clear is that central to all the aforementioned theories and conceptual approaches was the 
notion of the Third World, “as a set of national economies or as a subject in economics” (Wolf-
Phillips, 1987: 1318). This term gained increasing recognition in the early 1970s and “gradually 
passed from academic circles into popular daily use” (Ma, 1998: 340). The concept of the Third 
World has, therefore, been very popular, cross-cutting through academic, diplomatic and daily 
life spheres of activity. As exhaustively explained by many (Wolf-Phillips 1987, Kamrava 1995, 
Ma 1998, Thérien 1999, Payne 2001), the notion of the Third World was initially used in 1952, 
by French demographer, Alfred Sauvy, to refer to the „third estate‟, meaning the common people, 
before  the  French  Revolution
6.  In  it s  original  sense,  „third  estate‟  “implied  poverty, 
powerlessness  and  marginalization”  (Payne,  2001:  6).  Hence,  it  included  three  dimensions: 
economic, political and social. Because of this, “it was picked up by a number of scholars in the 
1960s to refer to that whole category of emerging ex-colonial countries whose economic, social 
and political conditions … replicated those of the French „third estate‟ in prerevolutionary time” 
(Payne, 2001: 6). 
 
Given the geopolitical context within which the Third World concept flourished - that of the Cold 
War  -,  it  quickly  stimulated  the  idea  of  a  First  (or  capitalist  West)  and  Second  (or 
communist/socialist East) Worlds. Hence, all of these were concepts deeply infused in political 
connotations, even though they were inspired by a point of departure that also implied economic 
and social challenges. As a result, those in the Third World were (in addition to their higher level 
of poverty) considered to assume a middle-of-the-road political position between the two major 
contending  ideologies  of  that  period:  capitalism/NATO  and  communism/Soviet  Union.  They 
became,  in  effect,  the  non-aligned  countries  -  which  placed  politics  in  the  forefront  of  that 
particular way of categorizing countries. 
 
                                                           
6 However, since Sauvy never used the term tiers monde, it is clearly a construct. 7 
 
According to Wolf-Phillips (1987), the term Fourth World - or the „Third World of the Third 
World‟, as some have referred to it (UNCTAD, 1985) - was only introduced at a later stage 
(during the 1980s) “to denote the least developed and chronically poor countries” (Wolf-Phillips, 
1987:  1313,  emphasis  added  by  author).  It  seems  that  the  reference  to  chronic  poverty,  to 
differentiate these countries from other poor countries in the Third World, is a clear indication 
that  - when defining this  particular subset  of poor countries,  i.e., the least  developed  - little 
upward  development  movement  was,  in  fact,  expected  of  them.  In  fact,  with  the  benefit  of 
hindsight we can see that this perspective is mirrored in the considerations of the UN Committee 
for Development Policy (UNCDP), which did not until 1991 (i.e., 20 years after the creation of 
the LDC category) consider the possibility of countries graduating from „least developed‟ status. 
Hence, the least  developed  could, in  essence,  be „trapped‟ in  underdevelopment, “hopelessly 
reflecting  the  notion  of  an  underdevelopment  „trap‟”  (Guillaumont,  2009:  30).  In  addition, 
conceding that these were “poor countries more likely to remain so” (Guillaumont, 2009: 9), also 
denotes an idea of hopeless poverty. 
 
Figure  1,  below,  is  a  depiction  of  how  economic  and  political  world  order  was  analytically 
structured and understood during the Cold War period and before the fall of communism in 1989. 
I argue that, generally speaking, this was the analytical understanding of the world that informed, 
or at least greatly contributed to, the UN decision to officially establish the LDC category, in 
1971. In fact, at the time, UNCDP (the body that recommended the establishment of the LDC 
category and proposed the initial list of such countries) explicitly distinguished in its reports 
between  „developed  market  economies‟,  „centrally  planned  economies‟  and  „developing 
countries‟, with the understanding that the latter was indeed its only realm of intervention within 
the three worlds framework in which it operated. For example, the 1970 UNDCP report stated 
that 
 
the ability to expand exports depends on the measures to be taken by developing countries themselves … 
However,  a  heavy  responsibility  rests  on  the  developed  market  economies  …  [and]  centrally  planned 
economies should create conditions for an increase in imports from developing countries … (UNCDP, 
1970: 20-21) 
 
Despite a supposedly new understanding of Africa‟s problems (due to the considerable number of 
newly  independent  African  countries  joining  the  UN  in  the  60s  and  70s),  “much  of  the 
professional work in the UN continued to revolve around the threefold classification of developed 




Figure 1. Analytical understanding of world order during Cold War period 
 
Jolly  et.  al  (2004)  consider  that  the  tendency  to  make  policies  based  on  this  threefold, 
homogenized classification was actually reinforced in 1964 with the establishment of the Group 
of 77 (G77) during the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
adding that even though the G77 “attempted to incorporate the concerns and priorities of all … its 
proposals on trade, foreign investment, transnational corporations, and transfer of technology … 
were inevitably of greater interest to the more advanced among the developing countries” (Jolly 
et. al, 2004: 160). Hence, even within the G77 framework, the least advanced were still being 
marginalized. 
 
Hence, it seems fair to assume that, while the three worlds classification served as the analytical 
model  on  which  the  idea  to  compartmentalize  the  Third  World  group  rested  (specifically 
highlighting the least developed subset within it), the premises defended by the modernization 
theory seem to have influenced the type of benefits attached to the LDC category, namely the 
emphasis  on  trade  and  the  idea  that  aid  should  fuel  industrialization.  This  is  reflected,  for 
example, in the initial LDC identification criteria, which gave more weight to economic factors, 
particularly share of manufacturing in total GDP. Accepting this analytical and conceptual model 
also meant accepting the logic of Third World homogeneity. This was, in fact, an often-voiced 
criticism  of  this  specific  way  of  country  categorization  and  worldview.  For  example,  in  his 
critical article „The myth of the Third World; a thousand million invisible men‟, published in 
May 1985 (The Spectator, London), Shiva Naipaul asserts: 
 
The Third World is a form of bloodless universality that robs individuals and societies of their particularity 
… Blandly, to subsume, say, Ethiopia, India and Brazil under the one banner of Third World is absurd and 
denigrating as the old assertion that all Chinese look alike. People only look alike  when  you can‟t be 
bothered to look at them closely … It is a flabby Western concept lacking the flesh and blood of the actual 
…  a  Third  World  does  not exist  as  such  …  it  has  no  collective  and  consistent  identity  except  in  the 
newspapers and amid the pomp and splendor of international conferences … The idea of a Third World, 















In the years that preceded the decision to create the LDC category, the idea of a homogeneous 
Third World - understood as the failed version of the ideal industrialized First World - was very 
much present. All-in-all, this was the image that provided the most powerful set of assumptions 
about  the  poorest  part  of  the  world,  believed  to  be  in  need  of  (industrialization-focused) 
development  intervention.  Third  World  economic  problems  were  “understood  primarily  as 
technical problems that [could] be overcome by the right mix of advice, investment, aid and 
liberal reform” (Berger, 1994: 270 - see also Ferguson 1990, 1994, Escobar 1998, Payne 2001, 
2005); which was related to the homogeneity assumption and the straightforward/mechanical 
vision on economics and development. 
 
The underlying principle of the LDC category seems to fit into this line of reasoning, with the 
safeguard  that  it  represented  somewhat  of  a  step  beyond  the  simplistic  First/Third  World 
dichotomy since, to some extent, it did de-homogenized the Third World by creating a subgroup 
within it. In addition, it also recognized (mostly in its narrative) some of the salient processes that 
perpetuate uneven development. Yet, other „worlds‟ were left „untouched‟; indicating that the 
prevailing international order remained essentially intact. Basically, this meant that the status quo 
was undisturbed, as was the global balance of power. I argue that establishing the LDC category 
did  not  significantly  upset  the  interests  of  neither  the  developed  world  nor  more  advanced 
developing countries.  In particular donors, by endorsing a narrative showcasing the altruistic 
prioritization of assistance to  LDCs (without a legally-binding obligation to implement it; as 
reflected by the low number of graduations to date), simply appeased voices against the status 
quo (without having to meaningfully change it and relinquish power). 
 
 
2.2. ‘Constructing’  a  new  category  of  (poor)  countries:  facts  and 
protagonists (1964 - 1971) 
Interestingly enough, the international debate around trade preferences
7 served as the springboard 
to the idea to clarify the list of developing countries and, within this general list, identify a new 
sub-category, grouping „least developed‟ countries (see Table 2, further below). The issue was 
first brought up in 1964, during the first UNCTAD, where 
 
la n￩cessit￩ de mettre sur pied, …, le nouveau syst￨me des pr￩f￩rences g￩n￩ralis￩es pour les exportations 
de produits manufactures et semi-factures des pays pauvres sur le march￩ des pays d￩velopp￩s …exigeait 
une décision précise quant aux bénéficiaires (de Lacharrière, 1971 : 464). 
 
This is actually quite telling as it indicates an important point: the initiative was not taken merely 
in recognition of poorest countries‟ disadvantages towards development and, hence, the need to 
                                                           
7 The so-called Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is a formal system of exemption from the more general 
rules of the WTO which obligates WTO members to treat the imports of all other WTO members no worse than they 
treat the imports of their “most favored” trading partner; that is, to treat imports from all other WTO members 
equally by imposing equal tariffs on them (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generalized_System_of_Preferences). 10 
 
provide  them  with  additional  assistance  but,  primarily,  to  facilitate  trade  with  developed 
countries. From this, one can assume that, to an important extent, development was equated to 
the  promotion  of  international  trade  (through  industrialization),  given  that  the  LDC  debate 
emerged from within a trade-related body within the UN. 
 
Against this ideological backdrop, the 1960s had been proclaimed the First UN Development 
Decade  and,  unsurprisingly,  international  dialogue  on  development  gained  particular  impetus 
within UNCTAD (Guillaumont, 2009: 19). In June 1964, during the first session of UNCTAD, 
countries were organized into three negotiating groups, respecting, as would be expected, the 
Third  World  taxonomy  prevalent  in  that  period:  (i)  industrialized  countries  with  a  market 
economy (i.e., First World), (ii) countries with planned economies (i.e., Second World), and (ii) 
developing  countries  (i.e.,  Third  World).  Developing  countries  constituted  the  G77,  which 
included newly independent countries and others non-aligned with either of the two Cold War 
contending powers. 
 
To clearly determine the group of countries that could benefit from trade preferences, UNCTAD 
(supported by G77 and OECD countries) opted for the principle of self-election (de Lacharrière, 
1971: 464); meaning, basically, that countries would be categorized as „developing‟ (and hence 
benefit from the Generalized System of Preferences - GSP) if they classified themselves as such. 
At the time, the G77 “refused any discrimination among themselves. Nevertheless … a general 
principle was adopted recognizing the need to consider a country‟s stage of development „by 
according special attention to the least developed‟” (Guillaumont, 2009: 20) among the G77. 
 
In this context, it is interesting to note the underlying political interests of rich countries in seeing 
this reform through. For example, according to de Lacharrière (1971), France perceived very 
clearly that if the reform only resulted in the creation of a single undifferentiated category of 
developing countries, African countries with which she had the closest ties were likely to be 
harmed  by  a  reform  that  would  only  benefit  the  most  powerful  within  the  Third  World  (de 
Lacharrière,  1971:  468).  In  fact,  France  was  more  aggressive  than  developing  countries 
themselves  in  exposing  these  risks  (de  Lacharrière,  1971:  468).  However,  at  the  end  of 
UNCTAD‟s first session there was no agreement in terms of creating a sub-category of least 
developed countries within the larger developing countries group. 
 
It was not until 1965 that the issue gained added impetus, when Argentinean economist and 
dependency theory advocate Raúl Prebisch - who had headed the UN Economic Commission for 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  (ECLAC)  -  took  office  as  UNCTAD‟s  first  Executive 
Secretary. Prebisch was well aware of the Latin American reality; particularly that of the Latin 
American  Free  Trade  Association  -  all  of  whose  members  were,  by  definition,  developing 
countries - where two sub-categories of countries had been created: (i) countries with relatively 
lower  economic  development  and  (ii)  countries  with  particularly  small  domestic  market  (de 
Lacharrière, 1971: 469). Hence, this perspective was brought into a wider, global context. 11 
 
By 1967, preparatory work aiming at establishing guidelines and proposals for the Second UN 
Development Decade (1970s) served as the background for the decision to operationalize the idea 
of establishing the LDC category. Building on UNCTAD‟s first session and following general 
recognition  that  economic  progress  during  the  First  Development  Decade  had  been 
“disappointingly slow” (UN, 1967: 42), UNCDP was mandated, by the UN Economic and Social 
Council and the General Assembly, to work on the aforementioned guidelines and proposals. 
Among  its  tasks,  the  Committee  was  expected  to  propose  a  new  international  development 
strategy for the 1970s. Accordingly, in its 2
nd session, in April 1967, UNCDP (presided by Dutch 
economist  and  Nobel  Prize  winner  Jan  Tinbergen
8),  considered  “imperative  for  all  the 
organizations of the United Nations family to redouble their efforts and to work out a series of 
new measures” (UNCDP, 1967: 27) to be included in the international development strategy for 
the 1970s. 
 
In October 1967, least developed countries earned a special (but quite general) mention in the 
final  declaration  of  the  First  Ministerial  Conference  of  the  G77  (the  Charter  of  Algiers), 
addressing possible international measures that could be implemented in their favor, including 
(rather vague) provisions on trade preferences and development finance. The G77 discomfort 
regarding this issue, is reflected in the Charter of Algiers when it states that it was not 
 
desirable or convenient to attempt an abstract general definition of such countries nor, at this stage, an a 
priori strict listing of such countries applicable to specific measures considered. Hence, this could be better 
undertaken, in due course, in a form agreed upon by the developing countries (Group of 77, 1967). 
 
During its second session, in May 1968, UNCTAD approved the principle of self-election for 
determining the larger developing countries‟ group and unanimously adopted the first resolution
9 
calling attention to the problems of the least developed among them; which was, nonetheless, still 
drafted in rather general and noncommittal terms. Yet, even though its general terms signaled a 
not very determined political will, this resolution had the effect of starting a bureaucratic process 
that, in parallel with the diplomatic debate, allowed further analysis of both the LDC concept and 
the special measures envisaged for these countries (Smouts, 1981: 51). 
 
As a result of the approval of the self-election principle, all G77 countries declared themselves 
„developing‟ countries and consequently entitled, in principle
10, to the GSP. What is interesting is 
that others not pertaining to the Third World also  declared themselves „developing countries‟; 
among  them  socialist  and  poorer  European  countries  -  Romania,  Bulgaria,  Greece,  Spain, 
Portugal, Turkey, Israel and Taiwan (de Lacharrière, 1971: 465). Hence, at least in this specific 
context, the dividing lines between the three worlds were starting to lose definition, primarily due 
                                                           
8 Tinbergen presided over the work of the UN Committee for Development Planning from 1966 until 1971, and 
subsequently continued working with the Committee as one its consultants. 
9 Resolution 24 (II), 26 March 1968 
10 But not necessarily in practice. 12 
 
to commercial interests; leading us to conclude that, as evidenced here, countries will self-declare 
to a not so positive label if they find it beneficial
11. 
 
Finally, the role of UNCTAD‟s Executive Secretary, Raúl Prebisch, is also worth highlighting 
considering that, thanks to his personal authority, the experience of ECLAC (which at the time 
granted special treatment to poorer countries in its regional integration programs) was brought to 
the forefront of the debate. This ultimately convinced Latin-American countries - who had raised 
objections  regarding  the  possibility  of  creating  a  sub-division  within  the  larger  developing 
countries groups - to at least accept the idea of a category grouping least developed countries 
(Smouts,  1981:  51).  With  this,  in  December  1968,  the  General  Assembly  adopted  another 
resolution
12, urging  UNCTAD  to pay special attention to  the problems  of  least developed 
countries. 
 
2.2.1.  A change in perspective … and a new category is born 
During  its  5
th  session,  in  May  1969,  UNCDP  explicitly  recognized  that  in  the  context  of 
international  trade  and  financial  policies,  there  needed  to  be  a  refinement  of  the  “twofold 
classification of countries as developed and developing” (UNCDP, 1969: 13). In its report to the 
UN Economic and Social Council, it stated that: 
 
In such measures as granting of preferences by developed countries to developing economies and providing 
them with financial resources, it seems inappropriate to have a sharp demarcation line between the two 
country groups. For … it would mean that at a point of time in the future a country would be considered to 
have shifted suddenly from the developing to the developed country group, and as such would experience a 
set-back  by  virtue  of  the  new  obligations  it  was  suddenly  asked  to  assume  in  place  of  the  assistance 
previously received. It seems more natural to introduce an intermediate group … which would not have to 
undertake obligations towards developing countries but at the same time would no longer, as a rule, receive 
assistance or preference (UNCDP, 1969: 13, emphasis added by author). 
 
Prefacing this, UNCDP - probably sensing the boldness or the newness of its proposal - was 
careful  enough  to  recognize  that  some  of  its  suggestions  “may  appear  somewhat  abrupt” 
(UNCDP, 1969: 3). However, it explained that it had chosen “to present certain provocative 
formulations” (UNCDP, 1969: 3) because the data on which it had based its recommendations 
                                                           
11 There is, therefore, a clear difference between the process to identify developing countries (through self-election) 
and the process to identify LDCs (through clearly defined criteria managed by a gatekeeper). At the time, also in the 
context of the GATT, “[d]eveloping country status was (and remains) determined by self-declaration - the only 
formal group of developing countries defined in Part IV and the Enabling Clause are the LDCs” (Hoekman and 
Özden, 2005: 6). This is basically the difference between choosing a label and earning/meriting a label. Apparently, 
the LDC category is more exclusive and, as a result, entry into it is more selective. This indicates that, from the 
donors‟ perspective, there are interests at stake when categorizing countries, which cannot be overlooked in the name 
of altruism. This demands cost management considerations in so far as pertaining to these groups entails granting 
them access, at least in principle, to a set of differentiated benefits. Thus, in principle, LDCs are entitled to more 
advantageous benefits than other developing countries. However, these are not automatic processes and whether or 
not these benefits are actually provided depends on donors‟ goodwill, which makes this type of preferential treatment 
non-legally binding. 
12 Resolution 2402 (XXIII) 13 
 
had “convinced it of the necessity and the urgency of certain radical changes in the prevailing 
policies” (UNCDP, 1969: 3). Although at the time, it had not been explicitly spelled out, the soon 
to be named „LDC category‟ seemed to fit quite nicely within that context, even though the 
argumentation  initially  presented  led  to  believe  that  redefining  the  twofold  classification  of 
countries was needed in order to, primarily, avoid an unfair situation where (having achieved 
developed status) the „intermediate group‟ (and not the least developed) would be expected to 
assume obligations after having lost itself the right to further assistance or preference. Therefore, 
the initial argument, at least within UNCDP, did not seem to point to the creation of a „bottom 
group‟ (i.e., the least developed) but, instead, to an „intermediate group‟ (i.e., the more well-off 
among developing countries). 
 
However, in December 1969, a General Assembly resolution
13 on “Special measures to be taken 
in favour of the least developed among the developing countries” was adopted and, for the first 
time in the UN, the need to “alleviate the problems of the least developed among the developing 
countries with a view to enabling them to draw full benefits from the Second United Nations 
Development  Decade”  (UN,  1969:  37)  was  formally  recognized.  Accordingly,  the  General 
Assembly requested 
 
to  carry  out  a  comprehensive  examination  of  the  special  problems  of  the  least  developed  among  the 
developing countries and to recommend special  measures,  within the  framework of the Second United 
Nations Development Decade, for dealing with those problems (UN, 1969: 37). 
 
Thus, between May and December 1969 there was somewhat of a change of hearts or, at least, a 
change of perspective on the part of UNCDP. While in May the focus was on introducing an 
„intermediate group‟ (going against UNCTAD‟s and G77‟s ongoing debate on the LDC concept), 
by December of that same year the General Assembly (whose decisions were based on UNCDP‟s 
recommendations) had changed its focus to a „bottom group‟. One cannot help but wonder about 
the reasons behind this change. Considering the context, it looks as if this was so as not to lose 
the  momentum  of  the  soon-to-start  Second  Development  Decade.  Thus,  alignment  with 
UNCTAD and the G77 seems to have been a way to reach swift consensus; at least in general and 
abstract terms. 
 
The following year, during its 6
th session in January 1970, while assessing economic growth 
prospects for different country groups, UNCDP used for the first time the term „least developed‟ 
in its report to the Economic and Social Council: 
 
For certain countries, especially the least developed among developing countries, there will no doubt be 
great difficulties, since  major structural changes  will be required, in accelerating the rate of growth to 
desirable levels; and in such cases special attention should be given by the world community so as to 
provide help in order to facilitate those changes (UNCDP, 1970: 7, emphasis added by author). 
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The new terminology seemed, therefore, to be entering UN jargon and what is so keenly referred 
to as „agreed language‟ in diplomatic circles. 
 
In that same session, UNCDP reaffirmed its conviction regarding the need to “refine the two-fold 
classification of countries as developed and developing” (UNCDP, 1970: 19), adding that a study 
needed to be conducted to determine appropriate variables or characteristics for this purpose. 
More importantly, the Committee acknowledged, for the first time, that it had also given “some 
preliminary thought to questions relating to the least developed among the developing countries” 
(UNCDP, 1970: 19), signaling that it now recognized the need to prioritize the progress of these 
countries. With this in mind, it constituted a working group (presided by French economist and 
diplomat,  Jean  Ripert)  that  met  in  March  of  that  same  year  to  address  issues  related  to  the 
identification of LDCs. 
 
In  October  1970,  the  General  Assembly  finally  proclaimed the  Second  UN  Development 
Decade, starting from 1 January 1971, and adopted the International Development Strategy for 
the Decade
14 - a document that included a section on least developed countries. Subsequently, in 
December 1970, it approved yet another resolution
15 where it stated the “urgency of identifying 
the least developed among developing countries and invited the international organs concerned to 
give a high priority to the question of such identification” (UN, 1970, 64). 
 
During the 7
th session of UNCDP, in March/April 1971, the idea of an „intermediate group‟ had 
apparently dwindled, giving way to the „bottom group‟ - the least developed. UNCDP was now 
very much focused on dealing with questions relating to the „least developed among developing 
countries‟  (UNCDP,  1971:  2).  In  fact,  prior  to  its  7
th  session,  a  working  group  on  the  least 
developed countries (that met in March 1970) presented its deliberations and, for the first time, 
UNCDP examined their special problems “with a view to recommending criteria for identifying 
those countries as well as special measures for dealing with their problems” (UNCDP, 1971: 12). 
In this context, UNCDP recognized that 
 
[w]hile developing countries as a group face more or less the same general problems of underdevelopment, 
the difference between the poorest and the relatively more advanced among them is quite substantial. … the 
capacity of these to benefit from general development measures varies widely. The least developed among 
them cannot always be expected to benefit fully or automatically from such general measures adopted in 
favour of all developing countries. Some special supplementary measures are therefore called for to remove 
the handicaps which limit the ability of the least developed countries to derive significant advantages from 
the Second United Nations Development Decade (UNCDP, 1971: 12, emphasis added by author). 
 
With this in mind, the Committee suggested the following three criteria to identify LDCs: (i) per 
capita GDP of US$100 or less, (ii) a share of manufacturing in total GDP of 10% or less, and (iii) 
adult  literacy  rate  of  20%  or  less  (UNCDP,  1971:  16).  The  focus  was  on 
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investment/infrastructure/trade (instead of nowadays‟ almost exclusive concern for social factors) 
and the idea was that governments needed to steer this. 
 
To be considered „least developed‟, countries should meet all three of the aforementioned criteria. 
Simplicity  in  methodology  was  privileged,  also  in  acknowledgment  of  problems  related  to 
availability  of  adequate  and  reliable  statistical  data  in  poorer  countries  (UNCDP,  1971:  15). 
However, exceptions were permitted: 
 
Countries with per capita gross product of $100 or less but with a manufacturing ration or literacy rate 
somewhat exceeding the limits … suggested should be included, especially if their average real rate of 
growth during recent years has been exceptionally low. Similarly, countries where per capita gross product 
is over $100 but is not more than around $120 and which satisfy the other criteria should also be included. 
In considering the border-line cases, however, judgment would have to be exercised to take account of 
special circumstances which may have distorted the recent picture (UNCDP, 1971: 16, emphasis added by 
author). 
 
Essentially, what this reveals is that there was considerable room for discretion when considering 
outlier cases. Taking all this into consideration, the following 25 countries were classified as 
„least developed‟ in 1971, comprising the original LDC list: 
(i)  in Africa: Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Benin (formerly, Dahomey), Ethiopia, Guinea, 
Lesotho, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, Upper 
Volta (now Burkina Faso) 
(ii)  in  Asia  and  Oceania:  Afghanistan,  Bhutan,  Laos,  Maldives,  Nepal,  Sikkim  (now 
integrated into India), Western Samoa, Yemen 
(iii)  in Latin America: Haiti 
 
Data  for  some  of  these  countries  (Maldives,  Bhutan,  Sikkim  and  Western  Samoa)  were  not 
available at the time. However, they were still included in the original LDC group since the 
unavailability of statistical data was considered proof of their low level of development. Yet, the 
Committee  did  recognize,  the  complexity  of  attempting  to  create  a  sub-division  within  the 
developing countries group, stating that  
 
a two-fold classification of developing countries into “least developed” and “other” is somewhat arbitrary, 
given the multi-dimensional complexity of economic and social development. Admittedly, also, there may 
be different concepts of least development, each of which may be especially relevant to a different field of 
action or in the context of a particular region (UNCDP, 1971: 15, emphasis added by author). 
 
The fact is that special privileges were proposed in favor of these countries, namely technical 
cooperation, financial assistance, and international trade and regional cooperation (UNCDP 1971: 
21-2). However, and unlike the LDC identification criteria, there was very little definition with 
regard to which special privileges would be devised and how they would be provided to those 
countries. Thus, paradoxically, the impression with which we are left is that these important 
details - which were, in fact, the core purpose for creating the group in the first place - were left 
vague. This might be explained by the unwillingness of donors to agree to anything too concrete 
and/or by the reluctance of more powerful developing countries to truly accept the LDC concept, 16 
 
considering that they themselves would be discriminated against. So, this vagueness was indeed 
in both of their interests given that, because of it, benefits associated with the LDC category 
could more easily become lettre morte. 
 
It is also interesting to note that the Committee found it necessary to include in its report to the 
Economic and Social Council the following disclaimer, which, to a certain extent, could be seen 
as indicating the uneasiness with which this exercise - i.e., the creation of a division within (the 
by then well-established group of) developing countries - was undertaken: 
 
Although the list must … be regarded as tentative, the Committee nevertheless wishes to stress its belief 
that the list is valid. The Committee believes that by any classification criteria the countries included in this 
list would surely be considered as least developed. … the Committee recommends that whatever list of least 
developed countries is adopted for the Second United Nations Development Decade, it should be reviewed 
and,  if  necessary,  revised  on  the  occasion  of  the  mid-Decade  review.  Moreover,  the  question  of 
identification should be given further study within the United Nations system with a view to refining the 
scheme of classifications and the related criteria (UNCDP, 1971: 20) 
 
This  might  also  reflect  disagreements  that  probably  had  to  be  overcome  during  the  May-
December  1969  period  in  order  to  reach  a  general  consensus.  In  fact,  the  Committee  felt it 
necessary to recognize that 
 
the granting of special privileges to the least developed countries may appear to discriminate against other 
developing  countries.  But,  given  the  peculiar  conditions  of  the  least  developed  countries  and  their 
consequently limited capacity to benefit fully from the general measures for all developing countries, failure 
to accord them these temporary but essential advantages would be tantamount to discriminating against 
them (UNCDP, 1971: 21) 
 
The  proposed  LDC  identification  criteria,  as  well  as  the  initial  list  of  such  countries,  were 
recommended to the Economic and Social Council that, after endorsing those recommendations 
in July 1971
16, submitted them to the UN General Assembly for final approval. Accordingly, the 
General Assembly formally approved  the list of what it considered  “hard core least developed 
countries” (UN, 1971: 52) in November 1971, institutionalizing the category. 
 




st session of UNCTAD (June, Geneva) - in the context of trade preferences, possibility of favoring the 
least developed among developing countries is discussed. 
1965   




nd session of UNCDP (April, Santiago de Chile) - in the framework of preparatory work for the Second 
UN  Decade,  the  issue  of  special  measures  to  promote  greater  economic  growth  among  developing 
countries is considered. 
 
G77  First  Ministerial  Conference  (October,  Algiers)  -  final  declaration  includes  section  on  least 
developed countries but refuses to clearly define them. 
                                                           





nd session of UNCTAD (May, New Delhi) - adopts resolution on the least developed among developing 
countries. 
 
UN General Assembly (December, New York)  -  adopts resolution urging UNCTAD to pay special 




th session of UNCDP (May, Bangkok) - recognizes need to refine twofold classification of countries in 
the context of international trade and financial policies. 
 
UN General Assembly (December, New York) - adopts resolution on “Special measures to be taken in 
favour of the least developed among the developing countries” 
1970 
 
UNCDP (March, Geneva) - meeting of working group on least developed countries 
 
6
th session of UNCDP (January, New York) - term „least developed‟ used for the first time in its report to 
the Economic and Social Council. 
 
UN General Assembly (October, New York) - proclaims Second UN Development Decade and adopts 
International Development Strategy for the Decade, including section on least developed countries. 
 





th  session of UNCDP (March/April, Geneva)   -  recommends  criteria  for  identifying  least  developed 
countries, special measures in their favor and suggests an initial group of 25 LDCs. 
 
ECOSOC (July, New York) - recommends to the General Assembly the list of 25 LDCs proposed by 
UNCDP. 
 
UN  General  Assembly  (November,  New  York)  -  adopts  resolution  on  “Identification  of  the  least 
developed among the developing countries”, where it approves a list of “hard core” LDCs, as proposed 
by UNCDP. 
 
Source: Author´s compilation based on UNCDP reports and General Assembly and Economic and Social Council 
resolutions 
 
With the value of hindsight, Jack Stone - director of UNCTAD Research Division when the 
category was created, subsequently director of UNCTAD Special Program for LDCs and known 
to be “the father of the least developed concept” (Weiss, 2005: 237) - summed up the process that 
gave „birth‟ to the category, which is worth quoting at length: 
 
There had apparently been resistance from the beginning to efforts to specifically identify these countries … 
It was said that every agency in the UN system and every division in UNCTAD should emphasize work on 
the least developed countries … yet without specifically or officially labeling a group of countries as „least 
developed‟. Presumably, countries could put forward on their own their claims to have special measures 
apply to themselves. … Since such a system could only lead to merely paying lip service to the category 
without any meaningful action, the UN Secretariat tried a few initiatives to identify a list, but without 
immediate success. Any specific proposals put forward were at best taken note of and sent back for further 
study. In the early days, the opposition to formal identification was mainly from India and some of the large 
Latin American countries, who were afraid specific identification would leave them out and divide the 
Group of 77. … But eventually, later as the LDC group grew and got more political strength, the LDCs and 
the  other  77  preached  accommodations  …  Somehow  or  other,  in  1971,  the  mandate  was  given  to  the 
Committee for Development Planning (CDP), still under Tinbergen at that time, I believe, to attempt to 18 
 
identify a list of the least developed countries, or the least among the least developed countries. Omprakash 
Talwar … was seized with the problem of making a recommendation to the committee. He came up with a 
list of twenty-five least developed countries based on three criteria: a very low GNP per head …; a low 
percentage of manufacturing in GNP …; and a third criteria was a literacy rate below 20 percent. That was 
the starting list. … UNCTAD had an expert group on the least developed countries at the time which looked 
over these proposals and strongly endorsed the list and its identification criteria, which then went on to 
Santiago in time for the third UNCTAD conference in April-May, 1972, where the list was again endorsed 
and then forwarded to and endorsed by ECOSOC … and finally adopted by the General Assembly in the 
fall of 1972. At last you had an official list of twenty-five countries of what we now abbreviate as LDCs 
(Weiss, 2002: 52-53). 
 
 
2.3. Responses to the LDC category 
An obvious question at this juncture is: how did other developing countries, specifically the more 
advanced among them, take this „split‟ within the larger developing countries group? Evidence 
suggests that the decision to  approve the list  of 25  ‟hard  core’  LDCs  was  indeed met with 
considerable opposition during the G77 Ministerial Meeting, held in November 1971, in Lima, 
Peru. Opposition came notably from Latin America, a region with only one country included in 
the initial group of LDCs: Haiti. Accordingly, there were (unsuccessful) attempts to push for the 
idea that „least development‟ should be regarded as a relative concept and, hence, considered on a 
regional, rather than global, basis (de Lacharrière, 1971: 471). Countries in the region alleged 
that,  in  order  to  determine  a  list  of  LDCs,  UN  Regional  Commissions  should  have  been 
consulted, so that regional and sub-regional agreements already in place could be duly taken into 
account (de Lacharrière, 1971:471). When this failed, there were attempts, still without success, 
to have the UN General Assembly declare the list and the identification criteria provisional (de 
Lacharrière, 1971: 472). 
 
Additionally, Jack Stone recalls that: 
 
In the early days, the opposition to formal identification was mainly from India and some of the large Latin 
American countries, who were afraid specific identification would leave them out and divide the Group of 
77 or provide a way for the Group B
17 countries to shift development suppor t from the other 77 to th e 
LDCs. (Weiss, 2005: 52) 
 
In the same vein, and according to Guillaumont: 
 
The  climate  at  the  time  –  marked  by  decolonization  and  cold  war  alliances  –  was  inimical  to  formal 
distinctions among developing countries. The developing country leaders among the Group of 77 feared that 
the position of the group would be weakened in relation to Group B. And the leaders of Group B had 
differing opinions about which developing countries most needed support from the international community 
(Guillaumont, 2009: 19). 
 
The poorest developing countries were known to have less experienced delegations and, as a 
result,  resigned  themselves  to  the  eloquence  of  delegates  from  more  advanced  developing 
countries; who, as would be expected, pushed harder for their own interests. So, to avoid dividing 
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the Third World even more, the poorest are said to have postponed their full satisfaction and still 
collaborated so as to, by not greatly upsetting group unity, pull the envisaged reform through (de 
Lacharrière, 1971: 468-469). 
 
According  to  Smouts  (1981),  opting  for  a  limited  choice  of  criteria  did  satisfy  developed 
countries, even though, for example, France was pushing for a solution a bit more flexible; one 
that could allow the inclusion on the LDC list of other countries from Francophone Africa and 
the Indian Ocean. Like all developed countries, however, France did not want an unreasonable 
extension  of  the  list  (Smouts,  1981:  52). Developing  countries,  however  -  having  reluctantly 
accepted the concept -  were more enthusiastic about other studies undertaken by the Secretariat 
of UNCTAD, which considered multiple criteria and proposed a broader definition of the concept 
of LDC (Smouts, 1981: 52), and would have allowed the inclusion of more developing countries 
in the category. 
 
Thus, having seen its proposals rejected, understandably, UNCTAD, who had been instrumental 
in initiating the issue of „least development‟ and had participated in parallel with UNCDP in the 
process, initially showed lack of enthusiasm towards the proposed list of „hard core‟ LDCs, as 
approved by the General Assembly in 1971
18. The fact is that 
 
resolutions at two sittings of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in 1972 and 1976, 
under pressure from the Group of 77, systematically referred simultaneously to the LDCs category and the 
categories  of  land-locked  developing  countries  and  small  island  developing  states.  Not  until  the  fifth 
UNCTAD, convened in 1979 … was the particularity of the LDCs clearly recognized (in resolution 122) 
(Guillaumont, 2009: 23). 
 
What is clear is that while donors were striving for a set of criteria that would not extend the LDC 
list  too  much,  developing  countries  hoped  for  criteria  that  allowed  the  creation  of  a  more 
substantial list of LDCs, guaranteeing that more of them would be granted access to additional 
special measures. When this is analyzed in conjunction with the UNCTAD/UNCDP difference of 
opinion, we see that, apparently, while UNCTAD‟s proposal protected the position of developing 
countries (by allowing the inclusion of more countries), UNCDP‟s proposal was more favorable 
to donors‟ interests (by restricting the list). 
 
Once  the  concept  was  generally  accepted  by  all  (with  different  levels  of  enthusiasm), 
disagreements  regarding  LDC  implementation  criteria  did  not  only  oppose  donors  and 
developing countries. It also divided donors, including two former colonial powers; France and 
Great Britain. Insofar as the selection of LDCs involved a reorientation and prioritization of aid 
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flows and trade preferences to those countries, the former colonial powers sought to ensure that 
these flows could continue to be directed to groups with which they were traditionally linked to: 
the Commonwealth for the English and French-speaking Africa for the French (Smouts, 1981: 
53). Hence, serving their own national interests - by manipulating the list of LDCs - seemed more 
important  than striving  for a  bias-free agreement  on  LDC  identification criteria. Self-interest 
superimposed altruism and the spirit of solidarity and cooperation, undermining the attainment of 
a truly genuine and unadulterated list of LDCs. 
 
For example, evidence shows that former colonial powers did seek to (by „booby-trapping‟ the 
initial categorization process) ensure that the category included countries with which they were 
already traditionally (and commercially) linked to. In fact: 
 
De toutes les classifications proposées: « pays les plus gravement touchés ﾻ par la crise ￩conomique …, 
« pays au revenue le plus faible » (utilisée par la Banque mondiale), « pays les plus pauvres », etc., la 
classification  des  PMA  selon  les  critères  du  Comité  de  la  planification  du  développement  est  la  plus 
restrictive et la plus favorable aux Etats Africains (Smouts, 1981: 53, emphasis added by author). 
 
This  realization  lends  more  evidence  to  the  fact  that,  from  donors‟  perspective,  politics  and 
strategic interests were the main (undeclared) drivers of the LDC implementation exercise from 
its  inception;  notwithstanding  its  narrative  based  on  good  intentions  and  grand  development 
goals, framed around the introduction of measures (i.e., normalization) to balance out an unequal 
economic  world  structure,  asymmetrically  biased  against  poor  countries  in  general,  and  the 
poorest ones in particular. The same argument applies for non-LDC developing countries. In fact, 
Jack Stone recalls that, for example, “the Indians … were watching very carefully as to who were 
included in the group. They were happy to keep it small” (Weiss, 2005: 57). 
 
Some argue that the category is indeed “a political definition to some extent, in order to include 
certain countries and exclude others” (Vienna Institute for Development and Cooperation, 1989: 
3), corroborating the „manipulation theory‟ referred to earlier. The fact that LDC criteria have 
become more and more sophisticated over the years can also be seen as an effort to make the 
provision of international benefits more rules-based as opposed to arbitrary, power-dependent 
and moved exclusively by donors‟ commercial and political interests. Whether or not this has 
been achieved within the LDC framework is an issue for further research. 
 
UNCDP did recognize that, since the initial list excluded large countries, it accounted for only “a 
modest proportion of the population of developing countries” (UNCDP 1971: 19), including, as a 
result, only a minority of the poorest people of the developing world. The fact is that countries 
included on the initial list of „hard core‟ LDCs were, generally speaking, small countries (in 
terms of population and influence) with very little bargaining power at the international level. 
Even today, reinforced by the introduction of a population upper-limit of 75 million people or 
less in 1991, the LDC category only includes small countries, which, in general, tend to assume 
“the default position of living below the threshold of global attention” (Payne, 2004: 623). This 21 
 
means one of three things: (i) international recognition that small countries face special problems 
and, hence, need special help; (ii) rich countries‟ unwillingness to give preferences to countries 
that really matter; (iii) other non-LDC developing countries‟ interference so that special measures 
would only be provided to countries that could not make significant use of them anyway. 
 
 
3.  Conclusions and avenues for further research 
Evidence  suggests  that  the  inclusion  of  more  (and  larger)  countries  could  have  impeded  the 
agreement necessary to create the LDC category, given donors‟ reluctance to extend the group, 
primarily due to added costs. For example, providing aid and trade preferences to India is quite 
different from providing those same benefits to Cape Verde or, for that matter, to any other small 
country. This also means that limiting the number and type of countries on the list also meant 
limiting the responsibility of those expected to provide them with special benefits (i.e., the donor 
community). Yet, Guillaumont (2009) considers that the official recognition of a special category 
of  developing  countries  represented,  in  and  of  itself,  an  exception  in  the  history  of  the  UN 
system; a system that had, since its inception, treated developing countries as a homogeneously 
defined group, sharing common interests and problems (Guillaumont, 2009: 19). 
 
Nonetheless,  the  creation  of  the  LDC  category  -  as  significant  as  it  might  have  been  in 
demonstrating  UN‟s  readiness  to  approach  the  larger  developing  countries  group  as  a  more 
heterogeneous group, breaking with past policy and modus operandi - did not upset the general 
structure of the world order, nor did it go against mainstream development thinking.  It was, 
however,  a  relevant  step  away  from  “old  ways  of  framing  the  international  politics  of 
development … grounded on a very basic, really rather crude categorization of states” (Payne, 
2001:  6).  In  particular,  it  addressed  the  oversimplification  and  unrealistic  homogeneity  so 
intrinsically present in previous analytical models. 
 
The creation of the category was indeed a success from the perspective of both donors and more 
powerful developing countries, considering that it was built off the three worlds‟ model - which, 
more  than  developmental  (or  even  economic),  was  a  political  approach  to  world  structure. 
Thereby, it protected the position of major world powers (concerned with maintaining as much as 
possible the status quo and protecting their economic, political and strategic interests), to whom 
the creation of the LDC category could indeed be supported, but never unconditionally nor in 
detriment of their own interests. Likewise, more powerful developing countries could not agree to 
a category that excluded them and included some of their direct competitors and, hence, settled 
for an all-in-all harmless deal, which would not significantly jeopardize their interests. Therefore, 
having the category set up on those specific terms (i.e., agreement on non-legally binding benefits 
to be delivered to small and economically and politically insignificant countries) seems to have 
been the best of all evils. Apparently, it was either that way or no way at all. 
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Thus, to a certain extent, the creation of the LDC category as proposed by UNCDP did move 
conventional wisdom further, since, in a way, it successfully addressed, even if unintentionally, 
the criticism regarding the unrealistic Third World homogeneity, according to which countries 
were lumped together and treated indiscriminately. Furthermore, it might have been a move to 
(try to) do away with the political connotation in which the concept of the Third World was so 
tightly  wrapped  around.  By  making  inclusion  into  the  LDC  category  dependent  on  a  set  of 
technically-constructed indicators that only addressed quantifiable factors, the process of gaining 
LDC  status  became  -  at  least  apparently  and,  most  certainly,  in  its  narrative  -  essentially 
mechanical, as opposed to political and, therefore, less open to discussion than otherwise. 
 
Considering  the  period  when  the  decision  was  taken  (initial  deliberation  in  the  1960s  and 
institutionalization in 1971), we see that many African countries were gaining independence. In 
this  regard,  Wolf-Phillips  (1987),  when  analyzing  the  general  acceptance  of  the  term  „Third 
World‟ in development literature, speaks of the initial reluctance to use it (Wolf-Phillips, 1987: 
1315). As a result, „underdeveloped‟ (a term used since the 1940s) assumed the second-best 
position.  However,  within  the  UN,  as  “membership  expanded  with  the  addition  of  „under-
developed‟ countries, the term began to be regarded as derogatory and was gradually dropped in 
favour of „less-developed‟ or „developing‟” (Wolf-Phillips, 1987: 1315). Therefore, we see a 
gradual shift towards the notion of „least developed‟, of which, I argue, the UN process that 
instituted the LDC category was an integral part of. 
 
So, what was the motivation behind the UN decision to establish the LDC category? Implicitly, 
LDC discourse points to normalization of international assistance (i.e., provision of a norm for 
the allocation of this assistance - being it in the area of trade or aid; both extremely permissible to 
donors‟  national  motivations  and,  hence,  susceptible  to  function  mainly  as  foreign  policy 
instruments). This means that by building an understanding (through the establishment of the 
LDC category) around the idea that international assistance should be primarily directed to those 
classified as LDCs, the UN expected to reduce the political nature (or the unpredictability) of 
donors‟ development policy decisions and, with this, guarantee a successful Second Development 
Decade. However, the implementation of this understanding was compromised by both donors‟ 
and other non-LDC developing countries‟ lack of altruism. This generated a category of small 
and  economically  and  politically  insignificant  countries.  Hence,  in  terms  of  analytical 
approaches,  while  the  LDC  project  as  envisaged  by  the  UN  fits  into  a  global 
society/interdependence/cooperation narrative and discourse, its implementation happened in the 
real world of international political economy where (the quest for) power dictates behaviors. 
 
The establishment of the LDC category represented an important step towards greater recognition 
of the plight of the most disadvantaged countries and the need to treat them differently and more 
favorably.  Indeed  the  idea  behind  the  category  did  represent  a  significant  advance  in  that 
direction. However, its operationalization has not allowed the category to live up to its main 
philosophy as indicated by the extremely low number of graduation cases. Clearly, without the 23 
 
fulfillment  of  its  political  foundation,  the  LDC  category  is  a  senseless  exercise;  rooted, 
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